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Abstract 
This thesis seeks to explain why rates of severe mental illness in the criminal justice system have 
risen steadily throughout the past three decades, despite an increasing acknowledgement of the 
importance of mental health to overall health.  Legislative, scientific, and societal advances have 
aimed at increasing access to and bolstering the quality of mental health care.  Yet, the large 
numbers of severely mentally ill persons residing in the criminal justice system imply care in the 
community is not adequately serving their needs, or that, for whatever reason, they are not 
seeking care.  I begin my analysis by considering mental health care through a justice lens, 
laying out three conditions that must be met if justice is to be served for persons with severe 
mental illness. The first is material-based and is that persons with severe mental illness should 
have access to the material resources necessary for them to thrive on par with the rest of society.  
The second two are value-based and have more to do with the recognition this group receives.  
First off, there should not exist institutionalized stigma attached to persons with severe forms of 
mental illness, and, second, policies should reflect the unique needs of this population.  When all 
three of these conditions are met, parity of participation is achieved.  This justice framework 
guides the rest of my paper, as I explore the current state of the United States mental health 
system, the consequences of its focus on mainstreaming, and the historical reasons why the 
system developed in the way it did.  I end by looking forward to small-scale policy changes that 
move persons with severely mental illness closer to participatory parity.  I ultimately conclude 
that, although these policies likely will aid in achieving some degree of participatory parity for 
this highly marginalized population of individuals, we as a society have a long way to go before 
such an ideal can be reached.  
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Introduction 
The primary research question this thesis seeks to answer is why, despite mental health 
parity legislation and an increasing awareness of the importance of mental health care in 
America, the rates of persons with mental illness in the criminal justice system continue to rise.  
According to a November 2014 report by the Treatment Advocacy Center, a non-profit 
organization advocating for the improvement of treatment laws for mental illness, approximately 
20 percent of inmates in jails and 15 percent of inmates in state prisons have been diagnosed 
with a severe mental illness.1  This statistic stands in stark contrast to the much lower 6.4 percent 
of inmates reportedly suffering from such illnesses in 1983.  Although I recognize that mental 
illness is more frequently diagnosed today than it was 30 years ago, research unequivocally 
shows a definite switch from state mental hospitals to prisons and jails as the primary providers 
of inpatient mental health care for persons with severe mental illnesses.2  This marked increase is 
surprising given the host of legislation passed during this same time period to increase access to 
mental health services.  On April 8, 2008, the Paul Wellstone and Pete Dominici Mental Health 
Parity and Addiction Equity Act (MHPAEA) was signed into law.  This piece of legislation, 
which requires that insurance companies treat mental health the same way they do physical 
health, was viewed as a major milestone by mental health advocates in Congress, as it would 
supposedly increase access to treatment for individuals with all forms of mental illness.3  
Following the passage of the MHPAEA, Patrick Kennedy, a United States Senator with a 
history of mental illness is quoted as saying: 
                                                        
1 Treatment Advocacy Center, “How Many Individuals with Serious Mental Illness are in Jails and Prisons?” 
Treatment Advocacy Center, November 2014, accessed February 2, 2015, 
http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/problem/consequences-of-non-treatment/2580. 
2 Ibid 
3 Colleen Barry L. Barry, Haiden A. Huskamp and Howard H. Goldman, “A Political History of Federal Mental 
Health and Addiction Insurance Parity,” The Milbank Quarterly, 88 (2010): 406, accessed October, 2014, 
doi:10.1111/j.1468-0009.2010.00605.x. 
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This legislation is one more step in the long civil rights struggle to ensure that all  
Americans reach their potential.  For far too long, health insurance companies have used  
the stigma of mental illness and substance abuse as an excuse to deny coverage for those  
biological disorders.4   
Such quotes, uttered by fellow Congressional leaders, sufferers of mental illness and other 
mental health advocates in the days and weeks following the law’s passage, imply victory for 
Americans diagnosed with mental illness. Given the significant strides our country has made in 
the way we view and treat mental illness, this is a believable assumption.  Organizations like the 
National Alliance on Mental Illness (NAMI) and Mental Health America (MHA) have worked 
tirelessly to reduce the stigma traditionally attached to these illnesses. And, although there is still 
a long way to go, medical researchers have discovered much about the causes of mental illnesses 
and thus have developed new and better methods for treating them.5  Despite these legislative 
and scientific victories, prisons and the streets continue to serve as the dumping grounds for 
many people with these illnesses. This paradox forms the basis of my inquiry.  Medical 
professionals and the general public have agreed that prisons and jails are not suitable 
environments for persons with mental illness.  So why does the criminal justice system today 
house nearly as many persons with severe mental illnesses as it did over 150 years ago?6   
This thesis seeks to unpack the historical and political forces that have created and 
sustained the above-explained paradox.  I do so by identifying problems with the public mental 
health system and exploring its development.  I then address the question of whether the 
achievement of federal mental health parity legislation is likely to improve the quality of life for 
those Americans suffering from severe mental illnesses.  I argue that the concept of community 
                                                        
4 Fred Frommer, “After 12 Years, Wellstone Mental Health Parity Act is Law.” MPR News, October 8, 2008. 
Retrieved from http://www.mprnews.org/story/2008/10/03/parity_finalpassage. 
5 Richard G. Frank and Sherry A. Glied, Better But Not Well: Mental Health Policy in the United States Since 1950 
(Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press), 44.    
6 E. Fuller Torrey, Aaron D. Kennard, Don Eslinger, Richard Lamb, and James Pavle, “More Mentally Ill Persons 
Are in Jails and Prisons Than Hospitals: A Survey of the States,” Treatment Advocacy Center, May 2010. Retrieved 
from http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/documents/final_jails_v_hospitals_study.pdf. 
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mental health care, although well founded, was not effectively implemented.  A lack of 
organization and neoliberal policies of the 1980s impeded the realization of a community-based 
continuum of care for mental illness.  Furthermore, policymakers did not account for the fact that 
releasing mentally ill persons into the community would not automatically lead to freedom in a 
substantive sense.  Given these realities, I provide suggestions for policymakers moving forward.  
I begin my inquiry with a discussion of what justice looks like for persons with mental illness.    
What does justice for people with mental illness require? 
Capability is primarily a reflection of the freedom to achieve valuable functionings.  It 
concentrates directly on freedom as such rather than on the means to achieve 
freedom…in this sense it can be read as a reflection of substantive freedom. 
-Amartya Sen 
Introduction  
 Justice for persons with mental illness requires a different kind of parity than that which 
has garnered so much attention in the policy realm over the course of the last two decades.  
Although parity under insurance is an important piece of mental health reform, it alone cannot 
achieve justice for the mentally ill.  A set of normative requirements for the treatment of 
mentally ill individuals in a democratic society like the United States is needed to ensure that 
justice is served for this group of citizens.  I have developed such a set, relying heavily on 
concepts put forth by two prominent scholars, Amartya Sen and Nancy Fraser.  Through a 
discussion of freedom, political agency and participatory parity, I lay out the ideological 
foundation for my argument for greater continuity of care in mental health.  This section will 
proceed in three parts.  In the first part, I outline the history of civil rights for the mentally ill.  
This will be followed by a discussion of procedural versus substantive equality and the 
unfreedoms often associated with the former.  The third section explains Nancy Fraser’s concept 
of participatory parity and its potential application in mental health policy.     
 7 
Amartya Sen’s Capabilities Approach  
Amartya Sen, a development economist who advocates for a comprehensive view of 
development, provides a good starting point for uncovering the type of public policy that would 
lead to justice for the mentally ill.  Sen’s capabilities approach to the evaluation of individual and 
social well-being is more inclusive than some of the more traditional approaches.  While 
theorists like John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin tend only to focus on whether a person has the 
instrumental means to achieve well-being, the capabilities approach looks at whether that person 
is able to use those instruments.7  More broadly, Sen’s approach differs from three oft-cited 
schools of thought in ethics and economics: classical economics, utilitarianism and 
libertarianism.  Unlike classical economists, Sen conceptualizes development as more than an 
increase in income or economic standing.  For instance, Sen would say that rich countries in 
which some citizens lack access to basic healthcare should not be labeled as fully developed.8  
Utilitarianism, on the other hand, in prioritizing the importance of mental satisfaction, does not 
leave room for the kind of constructive dissatisfaction that Sen views as a necessary prerequisite 
for positive social change.  I focus mainly on Sen’s criticism of the libertarian approach; out of 
which I argue today’s approach to mental health policy emerged.   
The libertarian school of thought emphasizes procedures for liberty, while virtually ignoring 
the consequences of such procedures.  This approach to social evaluation focuses on whether a 
person has the instruments needed to achieve well- being but pays scant attention to whether a 
person has the ability to use these instruments.9  Sen’s capabilities approach goes a step further, 
taking into account substantive outcomes.  He illustrates the idea in a book about freedom and 
                                                        
7 Amartya Sen, Inequality Reexamined (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1992): 42. 
8 Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 2011): 16. 
9 Sen, Inequality Reexamined, 42. 
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inequality, drawing a comparison between “well-being freedom” and “achieved well-being.”10   
While the former is procedural in nature and focuses only on the “levers of control,” the latter is 
a product of effective freedom.11  For those individuals who possess constraints that may 
interfere with their capacity to provide for their needs and pursue their ambitions, procedural 
freedom can be quite limiting.12  In essence, Sen’s approach to social evaluation reminds us that 
procedural equality does not always lead to substantive equality.  It is important to recognize that 
Sen’s vision of freedom, although it serves a primer for thinking about how justice for the 
mentally ill might be achieved, is still highly individualistic and does not provide a call for 
collective action.  For this reason, I have chosen Nancy Fraser’s concept of participatory parity 
as the primary model to guide my discussion of justice.  Fraser ties to provide a way of uniting 
procedure with substance in a manner that is appropriate for a democracy and thus gives the non-
ill a reason to care about individuals with mental illness.   
Participatory Parity and Severe Mental Illness 
Nancy Fraser’s concept of participatory parity provides a framework for rethinking mental 
health policy and the rights of mentally ill individuals.  Participatory parity constitutes the 
normative core of Fraser’s unique conception of justice.  According to Fraser, the majority of 
oppressed groups in society suffer from both maldistribution and malrecognition.  In order for 
the criteria of participatory parity to be met, both redistribution of resources to and recognition of 
oppressed groups must occur.  When both of these preconditions are met, all individuals are 
                                                        
10 Ibid, 40 
11 Ibid, 65. 
12 Wendy Brown, “Neo-liberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy,” Theory and Event 7, no. 1 (2003): 7. 
Retrieved from https://uranthplsc379.files.wordpress.com/2013/10/wendy-brown-neo-liberalism-and-the-end-of-
liberal-democracy-theory-event-71.pdf. 
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given the status of a full partner in social interaction, allowing the integration of recognition and 
redistribution under one core norm.13  
Politics of redistribution generally focus on socioeconomic injustices that are rooted in 
economic institutions.  When evaluating social justice through this lens, the victims of injustice 
are particular economic classes.  To address maldistribution, material resources must be 
redistributed such that participants’ in social life have independence and political “voice.”  Social 
arrangements that institutionalize deprivation, exploitation, and gross disparities in wealth, 
income and leisure are replaced with those that institutionalize equality of opportunity and 
outcome.14  While redistributive justice is fairly straightforward in terms of how it can be 
achieved, justice through recognition can be accomplished in a variety of ways. 
In general, politics of recognition attempt to remedy cultural injustices that stem from social 
patterns of representation, interpretation, and communication by ensuring that institutionalized 
value representations do not unduly burden particular groups in society.15  Misrecognition can 
occur in more ways than some might automatically conceive.  On one hand, a group can suffer 
misrecognition when they are labeled as different from the rest of society.  This form of 
misrecognition certainly applies to persons with mental illness, as historically negative views of 
this group of individuals has led others in society to avoid living, socializing, or working with, 
renting to, or employing persons with such illnesses.16  Universalist claims for recognition seek 
to remedy this injustice by reaffirming the equality of all social groups and thus unburdening 
misrecognized ones.  Misrecognition can also occur when a society fails to acknowledge a 
                                                        
13 Nancy Fraser, “Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics: Redistribution, Recognition, and Participation,” 
Lecture, Tanner Lecture on Human Values, Stanford University, May 2, 1994.   
14 Fraser, “Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics,” 31. 
15 Ibid, 6-7. 
16 Frank and Glied, Better But Not Well, 133. 
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group’s distinctiveness. 17  As I will explain in detail later, mentally ill persons suffer 
misrecognition in this way when mental health services are not tailored to their distinct needs.  
Differentialist claims for recognition seek to enhance group differentiation so as to ensure that 
any unique characteristics are recognized or unique needs met.  Mentally ill persons have 
experienced both kinds of misrecognition throughout American history, and although policies 
have attempted to remedy these injustices, none have succeeded in granting mentally ill persons 
parity of participation.       
History of Civil Rights for the Mentally Ill 
Mental health policy has, at several points throughout American history, considered the civil 
rights of the mentally ill as its core tenant.  Many of the reforms enacted have been oriented 
towards social justice in one way or another.  In the nineteenth century, inadequate and 
sometimes inhumane treatment of mentally ill persons in poorhouse and jails prompted the 
construction of state mental hospitals.18  At the time, very little was known about mental illness 
and the colonial practice of placing these “demented” individuals in poorhouses and jails still 
abounded.  Hospitals tailored to this population seemed like a humanitarian alternative that 
would allow mentally ill persons to actually receive medical and custodial attention, as opposed 
to wasting away in jail cells.  Dorthea Dix, a schoolteacher from Massachusetts, led the effort, 
ultimately establishing 32 hospitals in 18 states.19  Over the next 100 years, however, these 
hospitals deteriorated into something arguably worse than the poorhouses and jails they had been 
                                                        
17 Fraser, “Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics,” 31. 
18 David Rochefort, From Poorhouses to Homelessness: Policy Analysis and Mental Health Care (Westport, 
Connecticut: Auburn House, 1993), 36; Jennifer Erkulwater, Disability Rights and the American Social Safety Net 
(Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press), 53. 
19 Meighan B. Haupt. The Vital Role of State Psychiatric Hospitals. Technical Report. National Association of 
Mental Health Program Directors, July 2014. Retrieved from 
http://www.nasmhpd.org/Publications/The%20Vital%20Role%20of%20State%20Psychiatric%20HospitalsTechnica
l%20Report_July_2014.pdf. 
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created to replace.20  It was an effort that began as a marriage of redistribution and recognition 
that deteriorated once the redistributive piece languished.  Institutions that were founded on 
humane missions no longer had the resources to be humane.  As a result ,an increasingly 
negative opinion of institutionalization began brewing during World War II.  Referred to as the 
era of seeing patients “as people,” the decades leading up to the 1960s illuminated just how 
limited the rights of mentally ill persons had become, despite eighteenth century reformers’ 
efforts to enhance them.  Popular newspapers and magazines decried the conditions of the state 
hospitals.  Author Mary Jane Ward, for example, categorized mental hospitals as “snakepits” in 
her 1946 novel about a woman’s recovery from mental illness.  Nearly 100 years after Dix’s 
crusade, civil rights concerns again ignited a major shift in mental health policy, away from the 
asylums created for this very reason decades earlier.21   
Commonly termed deinstitutionalization, the years between 1965 and 1985 involved a 
straight and determined march from hospital-based care to community-based care, with little 
consideration of anything in between.  A coalition of rights-based advocates, frustrated with the 
lack of agency mentally ill persons possessed to decide the course and location of their treatment, 
began this march. 22   Their efforts rested on the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of protection 
under the law.  A 1976 speech at the Washington D.C. branch of the ARC, a national 
organization that promotes and protects the human rights of people with intellectual and 
developmental disabilities, called attention to the fact that this was not happening: mentally ill 
persons at the time lived “a dehumanizing life with none of the constitutional, civil and legal 
                                                        
20 Erkulwater, Disability Rights, 53. 
21 George W. Paulson, Closing the Asylums: Causes and Consequences of the Deinstitutionalization Movement 
(Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Co., 2012), 127. 
22 Paulson, Closing the Asylums, 163. 
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rights and liberties which [others] take for granted.”23  In addition to organizations and 
individuals who advocated on behalf of the mentally ill, the courts also played a key role in 
facilitating the movement away from state mental hospitals.   
Early on, there was a distinct split between those who wanted to enhance the positive rights 
of the mentally ill and those who preferred to focus on negative rights.  Dr. Morton Birnbaum, 
who is often called the “father of the civil rights movement for the mentally ill,”” “right to 
treatment” theory was cited in a variety of court cases in the 1960s and 1970s.24  His theory 
states that patients have a legal right to treatment that gives him or her “a realistic opportunity to 
be cured or improve his mental condition.”25  At the time Birnbaum authored his theory, patients 
could not be released from hospitals until they improved; however, in many cases, they were not 
receiving the caliber of treatment that would allow for such improvement.  The Bazelon Center, 
then called the Mental Health Law Project, refused to help Birnbaum enhance funding for 
institutionalized care.  This led to his theory being legally employed in a different way than he 
originally intended.  In an interview with Pete Early, Birnbaum explained that his goal was never 
to give patients the right to refuse necessary treatment but rather to force states to start treating 
patients.26  While Birnbaum wanted to ensure better care for the mentally ill, many advocates 
wanted to give this group the right not to be treated if that was what they preferred.  Lake v. 
Cameron (1966) established that the mentally ill should be treated in the least restrictive setting.  
Leonard v. Schmidt (1972) established that an individual must be declared both mentally ill and 
dangerous before he or she could be committed.  Donaldson v. O’Connor (1974) reaffirmed the 
                                                        
23 Melvin D. Heckt, “The Mentally Retarded Citizen and the Law,” The Arc of Washington, Washington, D.C., 
August 21, 1976. http://mn.gov/mnddc/past/pdf/70s/76/76-MRC-MDH.pdf. 
24 Pete Early, Crazy: A Father’s Search Through America’s Mental Health Madness (New York, NY: Berkeley, 
2007): 2538. 
25 Morton Birnbaum “The right to treatment” American Bar Association Journal 46 (1960): 499-504. 
26 Early, Crazy, 2564.  
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1972 case in its conclusion that a patient has a right to liberty unless he or she is dangerous.  
These court cases created the current divide between community-based care and institutionalized 
care by splitting positive from negative rights.  Patients were not given an affirmative right to 
treatment but rather an affirmative right not to be treated. 
A key thing to keep in mind about deinstitutionalization is that, despite its civil rights roots, it 
probably would not have happened had the only argument been a human one.  Although some 
early legislation tried to shift care to the community, civil rights advocates were not able to make 
significant headway until federal programs provided some means of support in the community 
for people with mental illness.  The introduction of Federal programs like Medicaid, Medicare, 
and Social Security Insurance (SSI) in the 1960s made the human argument for transferring the 
mentally ill from institutions to the community economically logical for states. 27  These 
programs were not created with the mentally ill in mind; however, they became the primary 
provider of resources to released mental patients.  Between 1955 and 1965, during which the 
Community Mental Health Centers Act of 1963 was passed, the number of institutionalized 
patients dropped by just two percent per year.  Conversely, between 1970 and 1975, during 
which the country experienced a large increase in federal social welfare spending, the number 
dropped by 11 percent annually.28  SSI in particular created powerful incentives for releasing 
patients into the community, perhaps too quickly.  First off, 1972 amendments to the legislation 
required Congress to “grandfather in” anyone enrolled in state assistance programs when the 
Social Security Administration assumed responsibility in 1974.  Second, and perhaps more 
directly tied to the magnanimous increase in the pace of deinstitutionalization, SSI stipulated 
that, while disabled persons living in the community were eligible for benefits, patients residing 
                                                        
27 David Mechanic, “More People Than Ever Before Are Receiving Behavioral Health Care in the United States, 
But Gaps and Challenges Remain,” Health Affairs 33, no. 8 (2014): 1417. 
28 Erkulwater, Disability Rights, 90. 
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in public hospitals and group homes were not.  This created a fairly easy decision for states, 
which could either release the mentally ill into the community, knowing they would likely be 
picked up by SSI, or renovate state hospitals to conform to the regulations handed down by the 
Courts.  
This timeline of the extended civil rights movement for the mentally ill reveals a desire on 
the part of a variety of actors to recognize persons with mental illness as equal citizens and to 
provide these individuals with the tools necessary achieve to well being.  Reflecting on 
deinstitutionalization, however, many of the legislative and judicial advancements have been 
nothing more than symbols of what should be.  Patients’ rights advocates achieved some of their 
goals, and persons with mental illness are substantially better off today than they were 100 years 
ago.29  Deinstitutionalization removed the physical walls that had literally and figuratively 
separated the mentally ill from the rest of society.  In addition, the new model of treatment in 
community settings achieved greater agency for mentally ill persons.  To reemphasize Sen’s 
argument, though, procedural gains cannot be counted as successful without ensuing gains in 
substantive well being.  One scholar writes: 
The importance of symbolic recognition, especially for groups that have been stigmatized  
and discriminated against, can never be overestimated, but it could nevertheless be  
argued that this is inadequate until supplemented by material improvements in the quality  
of people’s lives.30  
Community mental health certainly achieves symbolic recognition; however, it has developed 
into recognition without redistribution.  Justice, however, requires more than just fair procedures, 
as fair procedures without any substantive backing do not always lead to equality of opportunity.  
Does the public mental health system today sufficiently satisfy the requirements of participatory 
                                                        
29 Frank and Glied, Better But Not Well. 
30 Niraja Gopal Jayal, “The Challenge of Human Development,” Journal of Human Development and Capabilities: 
A Multi-Disciplinary Journal for People-Centered Development 10, no. 3 (2009): 360, accessed March 2015, doi: 
10.1080/19452820903041782. 
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parity and provide mentally ill persons with the capabilities to use these resources?  This 
question frames the following analysis of the community-based and highly mainstreamed public 
mental health system, as it exists today.  
The Current State of Mental Health Care  
Mental health services – for those with severe or not so severe illnesses – are no longer as 
distinctive, with their own set of dedicated providers, institutions, and policy-making 
bodies.  Today people with severe mental illness receive benefits largely from programs 
that also serve people with other disabling conditions.  People with mental illnesses of all 
types have their medical care paid for by the same organizations that pay for physical 
health care.  Mental health care has been mainstreamed. 
-Richard G. Frank and Sherry A. Glied 
Introduction 
A general problem in the United States, which spills over into mental health policy, is 
that we do not provide universal positive rights to social aid.  Instead, we have what is called a 
residual welfare state.  We let the market distribute resources, leaving the state to come back in 
later to insufficiently correct glaring injustices.  For example, the federal government provides a 
host of grants to poor mothers and their children, as well as checks to the unemployed.  In the 
case of the sick and disabled, rather than providing universal access to care, we condition care on 
one’s health status.  Forms of assistance include Medicare, Medicaid, and income support for the 
disabled, who are permanently impaired; some community mental health services and other 
patchworks of care for the mentally ill, who are considered sporadically or temporarily impaired; 
and employer-sponsored health care or no care at all for the well.  As a result, public aid is not 
available until an individual can demonstrate sickness.  In this way, the welfare state crystalizes a 
distinction between wellness and illness in medicine.   Since mental illness is best understood on 
a continuum, persons with such diseases would benefit from recognition of universal rights 
rather than conditional rights.    
 16 
Bifurcation between Wellness and Illness 
The conditioning of treatment on a person’s ability to demonstrate sickness is a natural 
outgrowth of our country’s tendency to draw a sharp distinction between wellness and illness.  
For more than a century, the biomedical model of disease has dominated American medicine.  
This model, which stems from Louis Pasteur’s germ theory of disease, understands illness as a 
deviation from normal biological functioning due to known or unknown natural causes.31  In this 
model of disease, practitioners recast illness, which scholar Arthur Kleinman defines as a human 
being’s experience of symptoms and suffering, in technical, medically understood terms.32  I am 
in no way challenging the claim that both physical and mental illnesses stem from biochemical 
defects.  Rather, I am pointing out the potentially adverse effects of approaching treatment 
through this bifurcated lens.   
Our central focus on the prevention, diagnosis and remedy of disease promulgates the 
idea that, by eliminating causes of an illness, practitioners eliminate the illness itself.33  In the 
case of many mental illnesses, this is simply not the case, as the most severe mental illnesses 
often require constant care and management.  In addition, research shows that serious mental 
illnesses can be better managed when identified and treated early on, prior to the onset of the 
severe symptoms that would land a person in an emergency room.34  In the context of Western 
medicine, though, a person is either ill or well, and there is little in between.  Under the current 
fee for service payment system (FFS), for example, insurance companies reimburse providers for 
specific services instead of basing payments off of expected costs associated with a “clinically 
                                                        
31 George Engel, “The Need for a New Medical Model: A Challenge for Biomedicine,” Science 196, no. 4286 
(1977): 130. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/1743658?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents. 
32 Arthur Kleinman, The Illness Narratives: Suffering, Healing, and the Human Condition (New York, NY: Basic 
Books, 1989): 5.  
33 Engel, “The Need for a New Medical Model,” 129. 
34 National Alliance on Mental Illness. Mental Illness: What You Need to Know. Brochure. 2013.  
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defined episode” of care.35  This bifurcation between wellness and illness discourages the 
development of a continuum of care for the treatment of mental illness, particularly for those 
individuals diagnosed with a severe and persistent mental illness (SPMI).  As I will explain 
below, many individuals with these kinds of diseases require continuous care over the course of 
their lifetimes.  As such, this population of individuals is never truly “well.”  
The Unique Nature of Severe and Persistent Mental Illness (SPMI) 
The 1999 Surgeon General’s Report on Mental Health defined SPMI’s as including 
disorders with psychotic symptoms such as schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, and severe 
depression and bipolar disorder.36  Although these diseases are relatively rare, affecting just .05 
percent of the American population, they must be given in-depth attention in today’s increasingly 
mainstreamed mental health care system.37  In the context of mental health, mainstreaming refers 
to the intertwining of the mental health care system with the general health care system, the latter 
of which oftentimes lacks appropriate knowledge and training regarding the unique needs of the 
severely mentally ill.  Mainstreaming also encourages the over-diagnosis of less severe illnesses, 
such as ADHD.  This over-diagnosis is likely a result of the need to wedge the condition into a 
medicalized category before accommodations and care are forthcoming.   
Persons with SPMIs have the most need for comprehensive and continuous treatment and 
tend to suffer most when a continuum of care is lacking in mental health treatment.  The 
consequences of not being able to access care are the most severe for these individuals, who 
                                                        
35 Suzanne Delbanco, “The Payment Reform Landscape: Bundled Payment,” Health Affairs Blog, July 2, 2014, 
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/07/02/the-payment-reform-landscape-bundled-payment/. 
36 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 
Center for Mental Health Services, National Institutes of Health, National Institute of Mental Health, Mental Health: 
A Report of the Surgeon General (Rockville, MD, 1999), 287. Retrieved from 
http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ps/access/NNBBHS.pdf. 
37 “Mental Health Conditions,” National Alliance on Mental Illness, accessed October 2014, 
http://www.nami.org/Learn-More/Mental-Health-Conditions. 
 18 
often have difficulty navigating even the most basic daily tasks.38  As I will explain in 
subsequent sections, the risk of drug abuse, homelessness and incarceration are particularly high 
for this group.  SPMI tend to be chronic in nature and thus to oscillate between periods of 
exacerbation, when symptoms worsen, to periods of latency, when the illness is less disruptive.39  
Furthermore, research indicates that schizophrenia’s course over time varies considerably from 
person to person.40  The presence of a biochemical defect, then, is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for disease.  Instead, the onset and course of schizophrenia is the result of an 
interaction between biological and environmental factors. There are instances in which a patient 
possesses a biochemical defect but does not show signs of illness.  According to the present 
conception of illness as a curable defect, such an individual is not ill.  He or she is well.  This is a 
dangerous categorization to make in the case of mental illness, given the variability in the 
clinical expression of SPMI’s.  This leads one to question the mainstreaming of mental health 
care that has occurred over the past several decades.  Policies reflecting such a bifurcated 
understanding of illness leave many mentally ill individuals with limited options in terms of 
continued care over the course of their lifetimes.   
Mental Health Exceptionalism vs. Mainstreaming 
The tension between policies based on mental health exceptionalism and those based on 
the mainstreaming of mental health care is not new and, in fact, has been a topic of debate for the 
past several decades.  There are two primary schools of thought surrounding this concept. 
Advocates of mental health exceptionalism believe that special rules should be created for 
mental illnesses compared to other classes of disease. They argue that, due to the unique 
dilemmas faced by mentally ill individuals, mainstream health programs cannot adequately 
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provide for this population of individuals.  Kiesler (1995) neatly states that while general 
medicine is oriented to acute care and hospital-based services, mental health policy should be 
oriented to long-term support, outpatient treatment, and community integration.  David Mechanic 
notes:  
It is understandable that mental health advocates insist on parity, but they must do so with  
the realization that persons with chronic disabling mental illness, and even many of those  
with less severe illnesses, require a different mix of services than does the conventional  
medical patient.41 
Going along with this, Frank and Glied (2006) point out that the general medical arena is not set 
up to provide the full range of psychosocial services necessary for comprehensive treatment, 
including but not limited to the provision of housing, job training, psychiatric care, and stable, 
long-term employment.42  This is where our institutions run afoul of science, which increasingly 
breaks down the mind-body distinction.  Parity legislation, by defining parity as the same 
coverage for care of mental and other medical illnesses, explicitly overlooks these sets of 
services that are unique to the care of severe mental disorders.  Furthermore, the overall system 
is already fragmented in nature, and thus the inclusion of mental health care into the general 
medical arena presents a host of administrative difficulties.43  Given the distinctive nature of 
mental health care, this group of scholars finds it more harmful than helpful to disregard policies 
of exceptionalism in mental health.   
Those scholars on the other side of the debate can be divided into two main camps.  First, 
there are those who focus on the economic and pragmatic motivations for including mentally ill 
individuals within the general medical sector.  Mainstream programs, such as Medicaid, 
Medicare, and SSDI, provide agencies serving the mentally ill with an unprecedented stream of 
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funding that has greatly increased consumer choice and standards of care.44  Thus, inclusiveness 
and mainstreaming of individuals with even the most serious mental disorders has resulted in 
tremendous gains in economic support for mental health services. Other scholars focus their 
argument in support of mainstreaming on social equity concerns.  Mental health exceptionalism, 
by painting an entire group of people as “different,” inhibits the opportunities of mentally ill 
individuals and disadvantages them in society, according to this point of view.  
Deinstitutionalization and reintegration into the community were necessary in transitioning away 
from paternalistic policies that ostracized and marginalized this group. 45  In the years since, 
several waves of reform have added layers of mainstreamed options 
Each of these schools of thought hinges its argument on the same component of 
participatory parity: recognition.  If the goal of mental health policy is participatory parity, we 
should redistribute resources and accord equal recognition to those diagnosed with a mental 
illness.  Proponents of mainstreaming emphasize the importance of the latter; however, they 
assume equal recognition can only be achieved by treating everyone in society the same.  The 
problem with this assumption is that, sometimes, equal recognition can only be achieved by 
treating certain groups differently.  The important question, which neither group leaves room to 
ask and which is central to achieving justice for persons with mental illness, is, “Which approach 
allows a mentally ill individual the ability to participate in decisions that affect his or her life?”  
This requires looking at the process (does the process affirm the dignity and capacities of the 
mentally ill individual?), as well as the outcomes (are the capabilities of the mentally ill 
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enhanced?).  The structure of the mental health system today is highly mainstreamed, meaning 
that, while the process is equal, the outcome is not always so.   
Sen and Fraser prove useful in assessing the efficacy of a mainstreamed system in 
achieving justice for persons with mental illness.  The question is whether the system today 
simultaneously bestows dignity upon the mentally ill and offers universal access to quality 
mental health care.  Under the current system, care is provided in a variety of settings, both 
public and private, and by a range of medical professionals.  The types of facilities that offer 
mental health services can be boiled down to three levels of care: 24-hour hospital inpatient, 24-
hour hospital residential and less than 24-hour outpatient.  Specific types of facilities include 
psychiatric hospitals, general hospitals with a separate psychiatric unit, VA medical centers, 
outpatient clinics, residential treatment centers (RTCs) and multi-setting (multi-service, non-
hospital) mental health facilities.46  The Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services 
Administration’s (SAMHSA) released its third iteration of the National Mental Health Services 
Survey in 2010 (N-MHSS 2010).  Data from 10,374 facilities was included in the report, 77 
percent of which are privately operated.  According to survey responses, the most commonly 
offered treatment approaches of these facilities include cognitive/behavioral therapy, individual 
psychotherapy, group therapy, and psychotropic medication therapy.47    
A major argument for such a mainstreamed system is that the provision of mental health 
care in the least restrictive setting avoids stigmatization.  In treating a person with a mental 
illness in the same arena as we would someone with heart disease theoretically allows that 
individual to receive quality mental health care without the stigma historically connected with 
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such.  Frank and Glied point out that, for many individuals with less severe forms of mental 
illness, this has happened.48  Mainstreaming has been moderately successful in improving access 
to and standards of care.  The switch to this type of care has allowed more individuals to receive 
mental health services.  In 1990, for example, inpatient hospital care accounted for 40 percent of 
mental health expenditures.  By 2009, this number had dropped to 25 percent.  To understand 
how prevalent outpatient care has become, one need not look past the following statistic.  In 
2010, nineteen times as many active clients were treated in specialty care outpatient settings than 
were in inpatient and residential settings combined.49  In addition to specialty mental health care 
providers, the primary care sector has also assumed substantial responsibility for mental health 
treatment.  In recent decades, an array of mainstream programs and providers have assumed a 
large share of the mental health services sector, many of whom do not have the specific 
knowledge and expertise to manage the most severe mental illnesses. Studies find that general 
medical practitioners administer 59 percent of all psychiatric drugs.50  Although many mental 
illnesses can be successfully managed in the community, severe mental illnesses require careful 
evaluation and constant monitoring, both of which can be difficult in a mainstreamed setting.  
Thus, in the case of SPMI, less restrictive settings are sometimes not conducive to quality care 
for this population because the care is less specialized.        
There exists a general assumption around mainstreaming that all mentally ill individuals 
can be treated, cured, released and left to live independently in the community.  Sen uses the 
metaphor of an unemployed man who receives an unemployment check.  He argues that the 
outcome is not the only standard of justice.  In the process of losing his job and receiving a 
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check, the man is demoralized and loses job skills.  In the case of mental illness, proponents of 
mainstreaming assumed that reintegrating the mentally ill into the community was enough; 
however, this point of view is not attentive enough to figuring out what would happen once ill 
persons were in the community and what institutions would be needed to sustain them.  Our 
society’s romantic conception of “community” seems to have clouded the fact that creating and 
sustaining such requires a high level of intentionality.  The community mental health system, 
however, was carried out more haphazardly than intentionally and, as a result, the system is 
anything but “community”-like.  Compared to other quality assurance practices, mental health 
facilities are least likely to systematically follow up with patients after they have been 
discharged.  Only half of the mental health facilities surveyed by SAMHSA in 2010 engaged in 
post-discharge client/patient outcome follow-up as part of their standard operating procedures.51  
We can place people in the “community,” but more is required if we want them to flourish and 
be accepted.  The failure to think through these important issues about what it takes to create a 
supportive community for persons with SPMI leads to some major consequences for individuals 
diagnosed with this class of mental illness.    
Criminalization of the Mentally Ill: A Consequence of the Current 
System 
Psychiatric disorders are the only kind of sickness that we as a society regularly respond to not with 
sympathy but with handcuffs and incarceration.  And as more humane and cost-effective ways of treating 
mental illness have been cut back, we increasingly resort to the law-enforcement toolbox: jails and prisons. 
-Nicholas Kristof 
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Introduction 
In addition to the public and private mental health systems that provide a hodgepodge of 
treatment services, a significant amount of “treatment” is also provided by a third entity: the 
United States Criminal Justice System.  The criminalization of the mentally ill is the most jarring 
consequence of our incomplete mental health system, as well as my motivation for writing this 
thesis.  National studies and individual state reports on mentally ill individuals in jails and 
prisons done since the late 1990s estimate that between 15 and 20 percent of jail and prison 
inmates have a serious mental illness.52  In 2011-2012, the National Inmate Survey (NIS), an 
annual research study performed by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) and RTI International, 
a not-for-profit research organization, included questions regarding the mental health of inmates 
for the first time in its three year stint.  Inmates were asked, among other things, if they had ever 
been told they had manic depression, bipolar disorder, or other depressive disorders, 
schizophrenia or another psychotic disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, or an anxiety or other 
personality disorder.53  According to the survey results, an estimated 36.6 percent of prison 
inmates and 43.7 percent of jail inmates reported being told by a mental health professional that 
they had one of the aforementioned disorders.54  Although I realize that a greater number of 
mental illnesses are diagnosed today than in 1983, the subset of the most severe mental illnesses 
have generally been recognized throughout this period of time.  These statistics suggest that the 
current conception of mental illness as something that can be cured or eliminated with the correct 
combination of medications and minimal follow-up has had deleterious effects on society’s 
ability to care for those with the most severe illnesses.   
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Today, a mentally ill person is more likely to be found in the criminal justice system than 
in inpatient psychiatric facilities.  Both of these settings provide around the clock care financed 
by the United States government; however, only one is designed with the well-being of the 
mentally ill in mind.  As of 2004-2005, there were more than three times as many mentally ill 
individuals residing in the criminal justice system as there were in psychiatric hospitals.55  This 
study includes both public and private psychiatric hospitals, as well as psych units of general 
hospitals.56  If we were to look only at the public mental health services system, thus limiting our 
analysis to the number of patients in public psychiatric hospitals, these numbers would be even 
more pronounced.  For certain states, the likelihood of being in prison rather than inpatient 
treatment is even higher than the abovementioned average.  In Nevada, for example the odds 
were 9.8 to 1 that an individual would be in a jail or prison compared to a hospital.57  The only 
state in which the odds are 1 to 1 is North Dakota.  In essence, jails and prisons have become the 
de facto mental hospitals.58   
 
Source: Szabo, “The Cost of Not Caring” 
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Prisons to Asylums 
Over the course of the last two centuries, mental health policy has created a vicious cycle 
of events.  The criminalization of the mentally ill is not a new practice but rather something that 
was the norm more than 200 years ago.  In the early 1800s, policies had not yet developed for 
dealing with mentally ill persons in a humane way.  At the time, very little knowledge existed 
about the origins of mental illness.  On the whole, it was viewed not as an illness at all but rather 
as the result of reduced intellectual capacity and distractedness.59  As I mentioned in the previous 
section, civil rights advocates worked tirelessly to change the inhumane practice of locking up 
mentally ill persons without adequate treatment and attention.  Their differentialist claims for 
recognition of the mentally ill as possessing unique needs led there to exist one inpatient 
psychiatric bed for every 3000 individuals by the mid-1800s.  This number was certainly not 
adequate, however, given that there is now recommended 15 beds for every 3000 individuals.60  
Dorthea Dix, arguably the most famous mental health reformer, finished Jones’ work.  By 1880, 
there were 75 public psychiatric hospitals for a U.S. population of 50 million, and the mentally 
ill constituted less than one percent of prison and jail populations.61   
Asylums Back to Prisons 
After adjusting for population growth, the number of mentally ill persons residing in the 
criminal justice system today is almost equivalent to the number in the mid-nineteenth century.  
An illogical reversal has occurred.  As of 2004, one inpatient psychiatric bed existed for every 
3000 people, meaning that an individual with a serious mental illness was 10 times more likely 
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to acquire a bed in 1955 than in 2004.62  In 44 of 50 states and the District of Columbia, a prison 
or jail in that state alone holds more individuals with serious mental illness than the largest 
remaining state hospital.63  The below graphic illustrates the stark similarity between the 
situation in 1840 and that in 2010.    
 
Source: Treatment Advocacy Center, 2010.   
As Figure 1 shows, the 16 percent of jail and prison inmates assumed to suffer from a serious 
mental illness today mirrors the 20 percent shown in 1840.  The “humane” alternative of turning 
severely mentally ill persons loose in the community without adequate treatment and attention 
was in reality a transinstitutionalization of these individuals.64 The closure of state hospitals that 
was meant to improve the quality of care for patients instead led to their being arrested and 
locked up in a different type of facility.  A 1981 New York Times editorial reads, 
“Deinstitutionalization has become a cruel embarrassment, a reform gone terribly wrong, 
threatening not only the former mental inmates but also the quality of life for all New Yorkers.”  
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These institutions that currently house large amounts of the severely mentally ill are just as bad 
as were the deteriorating asylums in the mid-twentieth century.  Designed to dehumanize and 
punish, these institutions provide just the opposite of what severely ill mentally individuals need, 
that being care and support.65   
 “Command and Control” Culture  
The term “corrections” is a euphemism.  At their core, jails and prisons are punitive, not 
rehabilitative, in nature.66  The “command and control” nature of prison culture is deleterious for 
individuals suffering from severe mental illnesses.67   Prison management is wholly based on 
obedience to rules, and there is a general assumption that all misconduct is volitional.  The term 
“corrections” has become a euphemism.  At their core, jails are punitive, not rehabilitative, in 
nature.68  As such, prisoners are held responsible for their actions, regardless of their individual 
circumstances.69  Yet, prisoners diagnosed with a severe mental illness are more prone to 
misbehave due to factors related to their illnesses.  According to the most recent statistics 
surrounding mental illness and prison behavior, disciplinary problems are disproportionately 
common among mentally ill inmates.  In Federal prisons, 41.2 percent of mentally ill inmates 
were formally charged with breaking prisons rules, compared with 32.7 percent of other inmates.  
The situation was even worse in State prisons, where more than 6 in 10 mentally ill inmates had 
been formally charged.  In addition, mentally ill inmates in Federal prison were more than twice 
as likely to have been in a fight since admission.70  These statistics elucidate the difficulty 
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inmates with mental illnesses have adhering to the strict guidelines of Federal and State prisons 
alike.   
Given the high rates of misconduct among mentally ill inmates, correctional officers must 
balance recognition of the role mental illness can play and the need to establish authority and 
keep order.  Since safety of the prisoners and security of the facilities are the main goals of 
correctional officers, order, obedience, and discipline are often prioritized.71  Correctional 
officers normally have little training in how to recognize and handle mental illness and are 
instructed to automatically refer any disobedient inmate to the disciplinary process.72  According 
to a 2001 survey by the National Institute of Corrections, 40 states provide some mental health 
training to correctional officers; however, such training is limited.  In fact, only seven of the 
prison systems surveyed provided more than four hours of training.  Correctional officers 
interviewed in a New York prison described the incarceration of mentally ill inmates as the 
facility’s “biggest problem” given their lack of knowledge on how to handle them.  This 
information suggests that, even if prison culture encouraged special exceptions for mentally ill 
inmates in the disciplinary process, correctional officers would likely be inadequately trained to 
recognize when such exceptions should be made.   
Overreliance on Psychotropic Medications 
Due largely to understaffing, prison psychiatrists sometimes have a difficult time 
providing compassionate, private, and patient centered-care.73  Although both psychotherapeutic 
and psychopharmacological treatments exist in correctional facilities, prison psychiatrists 
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disproportionately rely on the latter.74  According to a report by Human Rights Watch, therapies 
are often not multidisciplinary or individualized but limited to medication management.75  
Reliance on psychotropic medications as the primary method of treatment for treating SPMI’s is 
neither scientifically nor ethically sound.  When interviewed about the effectiveness of 
antipsychotics in disease management.  Rachel Diaz, the Director of the Miami Chapter of the 
National Alliance on Mental Illness (NAMI), said: 
  Taking these drugs is not like swallowing an aspirin.  Mental illness is not going  
  to disappear because you take a pill.  You do not become well.  The sickness will  
  always be there because the chemistry in your brain is not correctly balanced.76 
 
After reading this bold assertion regarding the dangers of relying too heavily on medication to 
manage mental illnesses, I was shocked by several statistics about correctional practices in 
Virginia.  During a meeting of the Behavioral Health Care Subcommittee in downtown 
Richmond, Virginia, I learned that a total of 9,316 prescriptions for psychotropic medications 
were given to mentally ill inmates in Virginia in July 2013.  Given the population of just over 
6300 mentally ill inmates in the system, this meant that some patients were on 2 or 3 medications 
at a time.  Yet, over the course of that same month, each mentally ill inmate received just 2.5 
hours treatment hours each.77  Ethical guidelines instruct prison psychiatrists to provide 
medically relevant care while an inmate is incarcerated.  The practice of placing mentally ill 
inmates on one or multiple medications, and providing minimal psychotherapeutic treatment in 
conjunction with the medication, does not fall in line with these guidelines.   
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Solitary Confinement  
 The combination of an intensely regimented routine, an inability on the part of mentally 
ill inmates to follow prison rules, and the tendency of prison staff to treat all inmates, regardless 
of their mental health status, alike in the disciplinary process leads to a disproportionately large 
amount of mentally ill inmates in solitary confinement.  Each day, over 80,000 U.S. prisoners are 
in solitary confinement, 25,000 of whom are housed in supermax prisons, or facilities made up 
solely or mostly of solitary cells.78  Prisoners who reported having been placed in solitary 
confinement were more likely to have an extensive history of previous psychiatric treatment.79  
Specifically, nearly a third of inmates placed in solitary confinement have at least one 
preexisting psychiatric condition.80  In 2004, over 800 of the 4,400 inmates in disciplinary 
lockdown in penitentiaries across the state of New York were mentally ill, and 480 had been 
diagnosed with a SPMI.81  Isolation can be harmful for any prisoner, much less someone with a 
mental illness.  The lack of social interaction and stress can exacerbate symptoms of mental 
illness.82  Individuals with previous mental problems often deteriorate in this environment and 
those who were healthy beforehand sometimes develop symptoms in isolation.83   
Sexual Victimization of Mentally Ill Inmates 
Serious mental illness is a major risk factor for prison rape and sexual violence.  This 
population of individuals is more vulnerable to sexual abuse for a variety of reasons, including 
medication side effects that lower their inhibitions and an inability to form the kind of support 
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network necessary to deter abuse.84  As a result, inmates diagnosed with serious mental illnesses 
are more likely to be victimized more than once, more likely to be threatened, and more likely to 
be injured during an attack.85  In 2011-2012, 6.3 percent of state and federal prison inmates 
under serious psychological distress reported being sexually victimized by another inmates, 
while only 0.7 percent of those without any sign of mental illness reported such victimization.  In 
jails, the statistics were 3.6 percent and 0.7 percent respectively.  In this same year, 5.6 percent 
of inmates under serious psychological distress reported being victimized by staff, compared 
with 1.1 percent without mental illness.86  A June 2004 study found that 57 percent of prisoners 
in New York’s intermediate care units reported not feeling safe in the general population.  
Revolving Door Phenomenon 
Disproportionate rates of recidivism suggest incarceration is not benefitting mentally ill 
persons.87  Two-thirds of inmates with serious mental illness are rearrested and half are 
hospitalized within the first 18 months of arrest.88  A primary reason for these high rates of 
recidivism have to do with the lack of community mental health services, housing and jobs once 
mentally ill inmates are released.89  Ex-convicts face incredible discrimination in the job market.  
This, combined with the atrophying of what family and social ties they had before incarceration, 
can contribute to a downward spiral.  The correctional focus on punishment as opposed to 
rehabilitation creates a missed opportunity to provide mentally ill inmates with the life-skills 
necessary for them to thrive in the community following their release.90   
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Why is the system the way it is? 
Neoliberalism normatively constructs and interpellates individuals as entrepreneurial 
actors in every sphere of life.  It figures individuals as rational, calculating creatures 
whose moral autonomy is measured by their capacity for “self-care” – the ability to 
provide for their own needs and service their own ambitions.  
-Wendy Brown 
Introduction 
Over the past 50 years, political and ideological forces coalesced to create and sustain the current 
system.  It is a system that can be described as a drawbridge with missing links.  The excessively 
rapid pace of deinstitutionalization, driven by a political desire to (a) save money and (b) respond 
to the exacerbated outcries of civil rights advocates, introduced fragmentation into the system.  
With only half of the proposed community mental health centers (CMHCs) built and no 
government-facilitated programs to connect recently released patients with treatment in the 
community, the movement fell apart.  Upon closure of the hospitals, many patients with chronic 
diseases became homeless, utilizing emergency room departments for episodic care and shelter.91  
Neoliberal policies of the 1980s exacerbated the already problematic situation by substantially 
reducing funding for community mental health services, prioritizing freedom and individualism 
over meaningful equality and collective responsibility, and instituting a system of social control 
disguised as a war on drugs.  It makes sense to go through these events chronologically, starting 
with deinstitutionalization and community mental health’s failure to create a continuum of care, 
and continuing with an overview of neoliberalism and the policies that stemmed from it.  By the 
conclusion of this section, I hope to have successfully illustrated how poorly designed 
infrastructure and neoliberal policies coalesced to fashion a broken system. 
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Community Mental Health and how it failed to establish a Continuum of Care  
Deinstitutionalization did not unfold in a way that was advantageous for persons with 
SPMIs.  Community mental health, as conceptualized by mid-century policymakers, was never 
fully realized.  An analysis of several key speeches and reports prior to the passage of the 
Community Mental Health Centers Act of 1963 insinuates that lawmakers had the well-being of 
mentally ill persons in mind when the law was created.  A network of CMHCs retained an 
exceptionalist attitude toward mental illness, providing all of the same services as mental 
hospitals.  At the same time, providing these services in the community removed some of the 
stigma attached to institutionalized persons.  This matched the vision of advocates, who also 
envisioned the CMHC program as a new kind of asylum that would integrate former mental 
patients into community life.92  In theory, the proposed movement satisfied both preconditions 
for parity of participation.  It broke down the literal barriers between mentally ill persons and the 
rest of society, whilst still recognizing the unique needs of this population.  Furthermore, it 
allocated public resources to a disadvantaged group.   
The Joint Commission on Mental Illness and Mental Health was created by Congress in 
1955 to survey the mental health system and provide recommendations for improving care for 
the mentally ill.  The Commission was made up of individuals from 20 organizations, and 
included representatives from public health, hospital, physical therapy, educational, nursing, 
social work, rehabilitation, pediatric, and government agencies.93  In being included in the 
Commission, each of these specialties was clearly viewed as a vital part of the development of a 
robust mental health treatment system.  The fact that the Commission was composed of such a 
diverse group of constituents demonstrates a perception of mental illness as psychodynamic and 
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encompassing a combination of biological, social and environmental factors. The Commission’s 
final report, Action for Mental Health, included recommendations for improving multiple aspects 
of the system, involving the outpatient, inpatient, and ex-patient portions.  Specifically, the report 
identified a need for broadening the role of the outpatient system, breaking down barriers 
between inpatient care and the community, and providing continuity of care once patients were 
released from outpatient or inpatient treatment facilities.94  There was a clear goal of integration 
and continuity of services, as well as an understanding of the distinctive nature of this class of 
illnesses.  
With the aforementioned goals in mind, Congress passed the Community Mental Health 
Centers Act in 1963.  This piece of legislation relating to the construction of Community Mental 
Health Centers (CMHCs) was contained in the larger Public Law 88-164, which also addressed 
related topics like research for mental illness and the training of special education teachers.  The 
Act authorized a total of $150 million to be appropriated to states for the construction of public 
and other nonprofit CMHCs.  These treatment facilities were alternative institutional 
arrangements to state mental hospitals and, as such, were established in direct competition to the 
latter.95  Money was to be given to states based on population, the need for CMHCs, and the 
overall financial needs of the state.  In order to receive federal funds, each State was to designate 
one state agency to oversee the construction of the centers within their jurisdiction.  This agency 
would then administer federals funds to public and private service providers, as well as set 
minimum standards for their operation and maintenance.  In order to become a licensed CMHC 
and receive funding, public or nonprofit agencies were required to submit an application through 
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their respective state agencies.96  CMHCs were established under a catchment-area concept, with 
each CMHC responsible for providing services in a defined geographic area.  There was to be 
one CMHC per catchment area, the population within each catchment area ranging from 75,000 
to 200,000.97   
From the beginning, the country struggled to fulfill the goal of providing citizens’ access 
to an interconnected network of services.  For one, CMHCs developed separately from the public 
mental hospital system, making integration of the two difficult.98  Although speeches and reports 
prior to the passage of the CMHC Act emphasized the importance of a combination of outpatient 
and inpatient care, this dual development presented challenges to achieving this.  Once patients 
were released from institutional settings, it was not clear whose responsibility it was to care for 
them.  When they were in mental hospitals, all of their needs – social services, education, income 
support, etc. – were met in one place.  Upon release, it was suddenly up to these individuals to 
navigate a disconnected network of service providers.99  In August 1974, the National Institute of 
Mental Health’s (NIMH) “Need for More Effective Management of Community Mental Health 
Centers Program” highlighted several impediments to the coordination of service delivery, one 
being poor working relationships between the centers and State mental hospitals.  Patients were 
being released into catchment areas without any notice to the centers.100  
Funding for community mental health did not grow in proportion to need during its first 
decade of existence.101  When the CMHC program was discontinued by the Reagan 
administration in 1981, just 754 of 1500 eligible catchment areas nationwide had applied for and 
                                                        
96 Community Mental Health Act. Public Law 88-164, 291. 
97 Government Accountability Office, Returning the Mentally Disabled to the Community: Government Needs to Do 
More (Washington, D.C., 1977).  
98 Ibid, iii 
99 Ibid 23 
100 Government Accountability Office, Need for More Effective Management of Community Mental Health Centers 
Program (Washington, D.C., 1974), 44. 
101 Need for More Effective Management, 64. 
 37 
received funding.102  Half of all patients discharged from hospitals during the first wave of 
deinstitutionalization ended up homeless or imprisoned due to this lack of facilities and 
personnel.  Furthermore, a formal connection between release from a mental hospital and 
placement in the CMHCs that had been constructed was almost non-existent.  Community 
mental health, although a good idea, was poorly implemented.  On February 5, 1963, President 
John F. Kennedy spoke to Congress about the importance of returning mental health care to the 
community in which individuals live.  He claimed that this more natural setting would facilitate a 
better understanding of individuals’ needs and “make it possible for most of the mentally ill to be 
successfully and quickly treated in their own communities and returned to a useful place in 
society.”103 His words paved the way for the passage of the critical pieces of mental health 
legislation that I outlined above. Had the system been fashioned in line with the text of this 
legislation, the situation today may very well have looked different, with severely mentally ill 
individuals possessing a broader range of freedoms.  
The two requirements of participatory parity are (a) redistribution and (b) recognition.  
With regard to the first, redistribution, CMHCs were supposed to provide mentally ill individuals 
with a full range of necessary treatment options.  The Community Mental Health Centers Act of 
1963 instructed government officials to construct an integrated network of services that were 
accessible, affordable and effective in managing mental illness.104  Had this network fully 
materialized, it would have given former patients the resources needed to exist as equal 
participants in social interaction.  Community mental health also satisfied the second 
requirement, that being recognition.  A discrete, community-based system for mental health 
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services recognizes the distinctiveness of the group of people being served without stigmatizing 
them in the same way institutionalization had.  The placement of the system apart from 
mainstream medicine ensures that the unique needs of the mentally ill are met.  The placement of 
this system within the community discontinues the long-standing marginalization of this group.  
Thus, the concept of community mental health satisfies both of Fraser’s preconditions for 
participatory parity and grants mentally ill individuals the status of full partners in social 
interaction.  Yet, somewhere in the transition between hospital-based and community-based care, 
both of these things were lost.  The centers themselves, as well as the distinctiveness of the 
movement, fell short of the redistributive goals articulated at the start of deinstitutionalization.  
Following, I review some of the initial attempts to bring community mental health in line with its 
stated goals.   
Initial Attempts to Remedy the Disconnect Between Hospital and Community Care  
Despite these initial struggles, continuity of care was almost immediately identified as an 
issue and related legislation was passed.  Between 1975 and 1980, Congress passed three key 
pieces of legislation with provisions to remedy the disconnect between hospital and community-
based care.  The Special Health Revenue Sharing Act required states to establish and implement 
a plan to: (a) eliminate inappropriate placement of individuals in institutions, (b) ensure the 
availability of appropriate noninstitutional settings, (c) improve the quality of care within State 
mental hospitals, (d) screen individuals being considered for inpatient care in a mental health 
facility to determine if such care is necessary, and (e) ensure that follow-up care is provided for 
individuals discharged from mental health facilities.105  All of these requirements share a 
common goal of improving and integrating institutional and non-institutional care to create a 
coordinated system of services fit to address the entire spectrum of mental illnesses.  The last 
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requirement in particular directly acknowledges a divide between State mental hospitals and the 
new CMHCs.  Shortly after the passage of the Special Health Revenue Sharing Act, Congress 
passed the Community Mental Health Centers Amendments of 1975.  This piece of legislation 
also tried to close the gap between hospital and community-based care.  Of the seven new 
services it required CMHCs to provide, follow-up care for residents of their catchment areas who 
have been discharged from a mental health facility was one of them.  As part of this requirement, 
CMHCs were to coordinate services with those provided by other health and social services 
agencies.106   
The National Mental Health System Act of 1980 was the final serious attempt to bring 
community mental health in line with its original goals.  The legislation explicitly acknowledged 
that the transition to community mental health failed to provide released patients with the support 
necessary to survive in the community and formulated a plan to address this problem.  The 
beginning of the Act reads:  
The process of transferring or diverting chronically mentally ill individuals from unwarranted or 
inappropriate institutionalized settings to their home communities has frequently not been accompanied by 
a process of providing those individuals with the mental health and support services they need in 
community-based settings.107 
 
The contents of the legislation reiterated the goals of the two aforementioned laws and 
incorporated many of the recommendations given by President Carter’s Commission on Mental 
Health.  In formulating these recommendations, the Commission heard testimony from over 400 
individuals regarding their experiences in the community mental health system.  Thus, the 1980 
National Mental Health Systems Act was well founded, based upon what was actually occurring 
on the ground.  Yet, the majority of the law, as well as the two laws described above, never fully 
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took effect due to shifting institutions in the 1980s.  Despite serious attempts to fashion an 
integrated system of community mental health services in line with Fraser’s conception of 
justice, events of the 1980s changed the course of community mental health and led us to where 
we are today.  
The 1980s and the Rise of Neoliberalism 
The 1980s characterized a large intellectual shift in how Americans viewed the 
relationship between economics and morality.  Neoliberal policies halted and even reversed 
many social welfare gains of previous decades.108  While liberal democracy, which, although still 
conforming to capitalist values, provides a kind of insulation between market values and moral 
and political principles, neoliberalism infuses market values into all aspects of social life.  In a 
regime operating on the basis of such rationality, economic growth, not overall social welfare, 
forms the basis for state legitimacy.  Brown writes: 
In neoliberal terms, democracy does not signify a set of independent political institutions 
and civic practices comprising equality, freedom, autonomy, and the principle of popular 
sovereignty but rather, indicates only a state and subjects organized by market  
rationality.109   
Throughout the 1980s, this rationality was reflected in the policies enacted to promote individual 
responsibility.  Specifically, the 1981 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, which ended most 
federal funding to state mental health agencies (SMHAs), combined with the War on Drugs to 
further fragment the system of mental health care and funnel severely ill persons into the 
criminal justice system.   
The neoliberal brand of thinking diverges significantly from the rhetoric of civic 
responsibility that abounded two decades earlier.  In his 1964 State of the Union Address, 
Lyndon B. Johnson declared an “unconditional war on poverty,” laying out a comprehensive 
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plan to address a variety of civil rights issues.  He spoke at length about hope and opportunity for 
every American citizen, labeling poverty as a national problem that required a combined 
national, state and local effort to eradicate and prevent. “Very often a lack of jobs and money is 
not the cause of poverty, but the symptom,” Johnson said.  “The cause may lie deeper – in our 
failure to give our fellow citizens a fair chance to develop their own capacities, in a lack of 
education and training, in a lack of medical care and housing, in a lack of decent communities in 
which to live and bring up their children.”110  Just two decades before the proliferation of a 
neoliberal ideology, Johnson identified lack of substantive equality as an issue deserving of 
national attention.  Attention was certainly awarded, as a wealth of federal action was taken to 
address the issue of inequality of opportunity.  Medicaid, the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD), and Head Start were just a few of the federal programs created in the 
1960s to equalize opportunity.     
Community mental health was among the many programs instituted during this era of 
social responsibility, during which it was politically important to ensure that every American 
citizen had the capabilities necessary to direct the course of his or her life.  As I mentioned much 
earlier, advocates of deinstitutionalization viewed mental institutions as oppressive and 
recognized a need for systematic reform.  The practice of locking up individuals simply for being 
“disadvantaged” or “different,” was increasingly criticized as legal discrimination.111  The idea 
behind deinstitutionalization, however, was not to release severely mentally ill into the 
community without assistance.  Instead, policymakers envisioned the CMHC network as “the 
asylum of the community,” the purpose of this new kind of asylum being to equip mentally ill 
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individuals with the resources necessary to be self-sufficient.112  The previous analysis of 
community mental health legislation revealed this intent.  The understanding of what it means to 
give individuals “a fair chance to develop their own capacities,” however, changed dramatically 
between Johnson’s presidential tenure and that of Ronald Reagan in the 1980s. 
By the late 1960s and early 1970s, a view was emerging that disadvantaged groups had 
themselves, and not larger society, to blame for their condition.113  While personal and individual 
freedoms in the marketplace were guaranteed, the social safety net was disappearing.  Each 
individual was to be held responsible and accountable for his or her own actions, regardless of 
any constraints that may interfere with that person’s capacity to provide for their needs or pursue 
their ambitions. Thus, the concept of citizenship was shifting from something collective in nature 
to something excessively individualistic.  If an individual, for whatever reason, was not able to 
successfully navigate the neoliberal playing field, he or she was assumed to have some kind of 
character weakness.  In a 1989 survey given by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, 58 
percent of respondents cited ‘“lack of discipline”’ as a potential cause of mental illness.114  The 
policy goals of the 1980s, welfare and crime, reflected these emerging themes about citizenship. 
Welfare had to be scaled back because individuals were responsible for themselves, and crime 
had to be heavily policed in order to ensure that unruly citizens were brought in line.   
The rise of neoliberal economic and political rationality during this decade led to the 
dismantling of key aspects of the welfare state.  On the whole, the 1980s was characterized by 
retrenchment from the powerful role the federal government had played in social service 
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provision in decade’s prior.115  Neoliberalism provided a theoretical framework within which 
policymakers could work to change the way social services were provided.116  During the 
Reagan years in particular, there were significant cuts in federal funding for a host of domestic 
programs.  For the services that were provided at the same level as they had been in previous 
decades, devolution and privatization were instituted to reduce costs, foster choice among 
clients, and develop competitive social service environments.117  This entailed increasing 
reliance on public-private partnerships.  During the 1980s, the federal government contracted out 
a variety of services that would otherwise have been produced by a government agency.118  In 
addition to reducing costs and promoting competition, these partnerships were intended to 
increase both efficiency and quality.  Private organizations would be much more successful than 
bureaucratic institutions at serving the public’s needs. The shift from public to private provision 
of services put more of the burden to seek out services on the individual.  Failure to obtain 
needed services, then, was not the fault of the government, or society at large.119  
The neoliberal ideology that predominated during the 1980s laid the foundation for how 
we think about mental health policy.  One of the most significant consequences of this ideology 
was the end of federal funding to CMHCs.  The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 
replaced categorical funding for CMHCs with smaller block grants.  In line with the neoliberal 
value of decentralization, the law shifted the financial burden from the federal government to the 
states.120  Today, publically funded CMHCs play a very small role in treatment, and the federal 
block grant to state mental health agencies is the only remaining source of discretionary funds to 
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these agencies.121  The shift to block grants in the 1980s introduced competition into the realm of 
mental health service provision and put a greater burden on non-profit and for-profit human 
service organizations to administer services that were previously administered by government 
agencies.  Social rights were less emphasized in this highly privatized and deregulated service 
environment.  Instead, mentally ill persons became consumers whose rights were contingent on 
their desirability as such.122  Local organizations were subject to funding formulas and other 
universal standards.  According to Fording, Soss and Schram (2007), such a structure can give 
local authorities and organizations an incentive to limit benefits and reduce costs, which indeed 
happened in the 1980s.  Since the overall goal was not to increase value necessarily but rather to 
fulfill certain performance standards, these organizations were not given any incentive to ensure 
that the care they provided was in line with consumer needs.  These changes set up a system in 
which the mentally ill became consumers in a “market” instead of recipients of public services.   
Ironically, although the federal government took a step back from social service 
provision in the 1980s, it became extensively involved in the criminalization of behavior.  
Michael Foucault, a French philosopher, termed such governmentality “the conduct of 
conduct.”123  Instead of government serving as an unbiased overseer of the general safety and 
welfare of its citizenry, it becomes a regulator of individual behavior.  Almost paradoxically, 
given the fact that neoliberalism is associated with the free market and state retrenchment, 
citizens are encouraged to act in a certain fashion, to be entrepreneurs.  In other words, an 
individual is expected to use existing institutions for his or her own benefit instead of crafting 
these institutions to achieve the greatest public good. 124   This organization of citizens’ behavior 
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is not achieved in a traditionally oppressive way but rather through laws and social policy that 
elevate individual choice, liberty and accountability.  Political Scientist Wendy Brown calls it 
“control achieved through formation.”125  Concepts such as freedom and equality are 
reconstructed to mean something very different than they had in decade’s prior.  
Neoliberal governmentality steered incarceration policy during the 1980s.  Drug arrests 
skyrocketed as a direct result of Reagan’s “War on Drugs,” and incarceration emerged as the 
primary method of social control.126  Between 1980 and 2000, the United States penal population 
increased from 300,000 to 2 million.  Today, that number stands at 2.2 million.  From an 
economic point of view, states paid $9 billion for correctional facilities in 1985 and $50 billion 
today.127   Contrary to popular belief, this exceptional growth in prison populations and costs has 
not been a result of an increase in crime but rather of a change in laws.  Mandatory minimum 
sentencing laws, the creation of drug task forces, and three-strikes laws are just some of the 
methods used to round up more prisoners than ever before in the United States, making us the 
country with the world’s largest prison population.128  Michelle Alexander uses the phrase “mass 
incarceration” to describe our present situation.  Mass incarceration involves not only the 
criminal justice system itself but also the larger web of laws, rules, policies, and customs that 
control those labeled criminals both inside and outside the prison walls.129  Loic Wacquant aptly 
describes the system as a “closed circuit of perpetual marginality.”130   
Neoliberalism, despite its rhetoric of individual rights, moved those with SPMI in the 
opposite direction of participatory parity.  Through policies that simultaneously cut holes in the 
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social safety net and cracked down harder on those who required it, the 1980s further 
marginalized persons with SPMI.  While it is true that mentally ill persons retained the civil 
“rights” achieved for them several decades earlier, they were never given the capabilities 
necessary to exercise these rights fully.  As unsuccessful market actors, they seem to have been 
cast into our streets and jails, punished for finishing last even though they started far behind 
everyone else.        
Moving Forward: Towards Participatory Parity  
A shared safety net is when a state implements an accessible and comprehensive 
continuum of care between hospital-based care and community-based care to meet a 
service recipient’s needs. 
 –National Association of State Mental Health Program Directors (NASMHPD) 
Introduction  
Having made an argument for parity of participation as a normative requirement for mental 
health policy, and laid out the historical and political reasons why our system has yet to fulfill 
this requirement, I will now engage potential solutions to the situation in which we find 
ourselves.  When I began my research, I was interested specifically in whether bolstering 
insurance coverage for mental illness, as federal parity legislation has done, would succeed in 
lowering rates of mental illness in the criminal justice system.  We can now turn our attention to 
the MHPAEA and the role such legislation can realistically play in reducing rates of mental 
illness in our jails and prisons.  There is a general consensus that parity under insurance will 
increase access to mental health services, and I do not dispute this.  Based on the evidence I have 
presented about the current state of the mental health system, however, I do not think it achieves 
substantive equality for persons with mental illness.    
 47 
Limitations of Mental Health Parity and the Need for Systemic Reform  
Between the early 1990s and late 2000s, mental health advocates in Congress focused the 
majority of their energy on achieving parity for private insurance coverage of mental health 
care.131  Parity legislation seeks to equalize coverage for physical and mental illnesses.  The 
MHPAEA does so by requiring insurers to impose the same financial requirements and treatment 
limitations on mental health care as they do on physical healthcare.  This includes things like co-
payments, deductibles and visit limits.  The law does not require an insurer to cover mental 
health care; however, if it chooses to do so, the insurer must adhere to these rules.132  Legislation 
that ends discriminatory health insurance practices against persons with mental illness and 
substance use disorders is a step in the right direction in the quest for parity of participation.  The 
passage of the MHPAEA symbolizes a large-scale shift in our country’s conception of mentally 
ill persons, from second-class citizens to equal partners in social interaction.  Even so, the law 
does not get to the root of the problem, that our society does not have substantive equality as a 
core value.   
This law increases access to mental health services for those individuals who have insurance; 
however, the failure of states to expand Medicaid has left many low-income working adults 
without the ability to obtain coverage.  In essence, parity helps the “haves” but does not touch 
the “have-nots.”  Yet, the prevalence of mental illness is highest among those of the lowest 
socioeconomic groups.133  Of the millions of low-income working adults who were not eligible 
for Medicaid prior to the passage of the ACA, 25 percent have a serious or moderate behavioral 
health condition.  More than half of this 25 percent suffer from a SPMI, such as major 
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depression, bipolar disorder, severe panic disorder, or schizophrenia.134  Therefore, for the 
population most affected by SPMIs, mental health parity does little.   
Furthermore, mental health parity does not address the root of the problem: a broken mental 
health system.  Community mental health was not inherently a bad policy.  Its ultimate undoing 
stemmed from the failure of policymakers to integrate community mental health services and to 
recognize the extra constraints faced by mentally ill persons living in the community.  As a 
result, the mental health system today does not provide adequate material resources to severely 
mentally ill persons, or reflect the unique needs of this population.  First, although material 
resources exist, there is no clear bridge between all of the different types of services.  As such, 
the system is difficult to navigate.  Therefore, my first recommendation focuses on linking these 
services to one another through integrated treatment approaches.  In addition, mental health 
policy does not reflect the unique needs of persons with severe mental illnesses.  Although I do 
not in any way think we should fully replace community treatment services with inpatient care, I 
recommend increasing the number of inpatient beds in psychiatric hospitals to meet the current 
demand.  I recognize that these recommendations are just a beginning in creating widespread 
change in the realm of mental health care and in achieving substantive equality; however, they 
are a start.     
Recommendation 1: Improved Case Management for Persons with Severe Mental 
Illness 
My first recommendation aims to integrate existing modes of mental health treatment 
through improved case management for persons with severe mental illness.  The idea of case 
management originally developed following the establishment of Community Support Programs 
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(CSPs) by the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) in the 1960s.135  Influential models of 
case management for this population include Assertive Community Treatment (ACT) and 
Intensive Case Management (ICM).  ACT is an intensive treatment model in which a 
multidisciplinary team provides community care for patients with a severe mental illness.136  It 
was developed specifically for persons with severe or chronic psychosis, as well as for patients 
with high service use.  Unique aspects of ACT include a team of clinicians who share a relatively 
small patient load, 24-hour coverage and at-home services.  The effectiveness of ACT has been 
extensively studied and found to be effective at reducing hospitalizations, stabilizing housing, 
reducing the severity of symptoms, improving quality of life, and lowering overall treatment 
costs.137  In addition, studies have shown that PACT greatly reduces inpatient use and promotes 
continuity of outpatient care.138  Evidence also suggests that consumers can improve in an ACT 
program and then be transferred to less intensive services.139  When combined with more 
specialized interventions, such as Integrated Dual Diagnosis Treatment (IDDT), ACT is 
associated with a decrease in nuisance acts and convictions.140   
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Recommendation 2: Increase the amount of funding attached to the Mental Health 
Block Grant (MHBG) and alter the criteria to allow for its dissemination to state 
psychiatric hospitals. 
My second recommendation attempts to bolster public mental health services by 
increasing access to acute inpatient care in state psychiatric hospitals.  I am in no way advocating 
for an increase in the scope of inpatient care but rather for an increase in its availability for those 
who meet the criteria for admittance.  This type of care is only appropriate for persons who 
cannot be safely and effectively treated in other, less restrictive settings.141  The demand for 
inpatient beds largely outstrips current supply.  Between 1986 and 2005, inpatient care as a 
percentage of total mental health expenditures dropped from 42 to 19 percent.  Conversely, 
expenditures on outpatient services and prescription drugs increased.  The number of inpatient 
psychiatric beds across all states over a similar time period has decreased by 32.5 percent. 142   
 
Source: National Association of State Mental Health Directors, 2013.  
                                                        
141 Haupt. The Vital Role, 23. 
142 National Alliance on Mental Illness, State Mental Health Cuts: A National Crisis, Report, March 2011. 
http://www2.nami.org/Template.cfm?Section=state_budget_cuts_report. 
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The continued migration from inpatient to outpatient care can be traced to cost concerns held by 
states.  Inpatient psychiatric care is expensive, totaling more than $260,000 per patient annually 
in some states.143  The continued criminalization of mental illness, particularly severe mental 
illness, however, indicates that outpatient treatment is not sufficient on its own.  States are 
paying comparable amounts of money to handle the consequences of untreated mental illness.  A 
94-day incarceration costs $30,258, and a 19-day stay in a general hospital costs just under 
$32,000.144 
Specifically, I suggest that the federal government increase MHBG appropriations and allow 
this money to be used for inpatient care in state psychiatric hospitals.  Currently, the MHBG 
constitutes the only federal source of discretionary funding for mental health care.145  In fiscal 
year (FY) 2013, the mental health block grant accounted for just one percent of the total revenue 
received by State Mental Health Agencies (SMHAs), amounting to $398.7 million.146  It has 
grown very little over the past decade or so when taking into account inflation.  In essence, this 
money represents an abysmally small portion of total funding for public mental health services, 
but it plays a crucial role in providing care to individuals without Medicaid or other insurance 
coverage.147  Therefore, an increase in funding for the MHBG would benefit the population most 
affected by SPMI, the uninsured.    
                                                        
143 Sisti, Improving Long-term Psychiatric Care, 244.  
144 Liz Szabo, “The Cost of Not Caring,” USA Today. Retrieved from 
http://www.usatoday.com/longform/news/nation/2014/05/12/mental-health-system-crisis/7746535/. 
145 Ibid, 18.   
146 National Association of State Mental Health Program Directors, State Mental Health Agency Revenues, State 
Fiscal Year 2013, by Robert Shaw and Ted Lutterman (Washington, D.C., 2013), 15.  
147 State Mental Health Agency Revenues, 16. 
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  Source: National Association of State Mental Health Directors, 2013. 
 
In addition to the small amount of funding attached to it, my primary qualm with the MHBG is 
that it cannot be used to fund treatment in state psychiatric hospitals.  Therefore, it makes up 0.0 
percent of total expenditures of inpatient psychiatric care.148  If the grant criteria were broadened 
to allow for its dissemination to inpatient psychiatric hospitals, states could utilize it to increase 
the number of inpatient beds and create more options for persons with severe mental illness.  
This, along with a greater focus on case management programs like ACT, should move persons 
with the most severe forms of mental illness closer to participatory parity.   
                                                        
148 State Mental Health Agency Revenues, 22-23. 
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Conclusion 
After spending months researching the history of mental health policy, I have concluded that 
there does not exist a one-size-fits-all approach to mental health treatment, particularly when 
thinking about treatment through a justice lens.  Throughout history, mental health policy has 
hinged on the idea that one approach, whether that be care in hospitals or care in the community, 
is best.  This tug of war between the two is evident in the ebb and flow of policy, between 
institutionalization and community care.  One of the earliest solutions was to institutionalize this 
population, the assumption being that persons with severe mental illnesses were second- class 
citizens and unable to provide for themselves.  Because of this, material resources had to be 
redistributed to them through mental hospitals, where they would live separately from the rest of 
society.  Nearly 100 years later, policymakers swung in the opposite direction.  Community-
based treatment gradually came to be viewed as the best option for persons with mental illnesses, 
even severe forms of such, and superior in every way to inpatient care.  The new thought was 
that mentally ill persons should be recognized as equal partners in social interaction and should 
have the right not to be forcibly treated.  This switch from a focus on positive to negative rights 
has solidified over the years, to the point that inpatient care makes up an extremely small portion 
of mental health treatment.  The ideal approach to mental health policy, however, falls 
somewhere in between these two extremes.  Based on my research, this ideal, which combines 
recognition with redistribution, has yet to exist in the history of the United States.   
My two recommendations moving forward are just a starting point in repairing the broken 
mental health system and achieving parity of participation for persons with severe mental 
illnesses.  As I endeavored to convey through my discussion of community mental health and the 
neoliberal leanings of the 1980s, decades of opposing reforms layered on top of one another have 
resulted in a highly fragmented system.  Connecting the pieces of the system through more 
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effective case management should make it easier to navigate, just as adding inpatient options 
should add some “exceptionalist” flavor back into mental health policy; however, neither of 
these recommendations addresses the root of the problem: the residual welfare state.  If 
substantive change is going to occur for persons with the most severe forms of mental illness, 
our society is going to need to shift from reactionary to anticipatory policies.  Instead of coming 
in after the market has failed to equitably distribute resources and recognize the particular 
nuances of certain groups, we should approach mental health treatment as a positive right.  It is 
only through such a shift in mindset, from seeing  all persons as neoliberal actors to collective 
citizens, that participatory parity for persons with the most severe forms of mental illness might 
be reached. 
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